Summary of the Papers “The Statue and Clay” By Judith Jarvis Thomson and “Things, stuffs and coincidence” by Nikos Psarros

Both the papers are attempting a solution to the problem of coinciding objects. Thomson takes an example of a piece of clay called “CLAY” and a statue of clay of King Alfred called “ALFRED”. The problem of coinciding objects is about the relationship between CLAY and ALFRED. Both the authors present solutions which are different but still agree on the point that CLAY and ALFRED should not be given same ontologically status i.e. both the authors reject the identity thesis which claims that CLAY and ALFRED are the same.

The Statue and Clay
If I bought ten pound of clay at 9 AM (CLAY) and made a statue at 2 PM on the table (ALFRED) then
Is ALFRED = CLAY?
At 9 AM there was only CLAY and no ALFRED but at 2 PM there is CLAY as well as ALFRED occupying the same place at the same time. Moreover, if I break the statue at 5 PM then again there will be just CLAY and no ALFRED. So, can we say that being a statue is just a temporary property of CLAY? This thesis could be applied to any artifact. This gives an answer to the problem of Identity Thesis. We can say that CLAY = ALFRED at 2 PM and that CLAY ≠ ALFRED at 9 AM and 5 PM. The temporary property of being an artifact can be instantiated from time to time.

But author points to a stronger argument against Identity Thesis. It is the replacement argument. Suppose, I replace one hand of ALFRED with a new one and place the old one on the floor. Then surely, the CLAY is not wholly on the table but it is can be accepted that ALFRED is still on the table because in ordinary thought artifacts are generally capable of undergoing replacement. If we accept this then we have to face a paradox called poor man paradox. If a poor man is given a penny that doesn’t change his status of poor man and he is given another penny that also doesn’t change the situation, but if he is given pennies one by one, then ultimately he would become rich. So how many pennies are needed to make him rich”. Similarly, if all a large part of ALFRED is replaced, then we will have to accept that the old ALRED has been replaced. In such a situation ordinary thought does not supply with answer.

Thomson accepts that the difficulties are serious. “Some philosophers therefore conclude that artifacts cannot undergo replacement of any part, and others that there are no artifacts at all” (Thomson, 1998, pp. 153). Thomson rejects both the arguments and simply supposes that ALFRED is on the table after replacement of one hand but CLAY is not. Now she goes on to define what “constituting is”. The two place relation ‘x constitutes y’ is a temporary relation because before replacement CLAY constituted ALFRED but not after the replacement. This can be easily overcome by using a three place relation instead of two place relation. The three place relation ‘x constitutes y at t’ is a permanent relation.

Now, Thomson establishes a logical framework for further arguments:
(i) x exists at t --> x is a part of x at t.
(ii) x is part of y at t --> x and y both exist at t.
(iii) x is part of y at t <-- --> the space occupied by x at t is part of the place occupied by y at t.

Now, she defines the phrase ‘x constitutes y at t’ or ‘CLAY constitutes ALFRED at t’ by giving logical statements. The first statement in the definition essentially asserts that both CLAY and ALFRED are part of each other. Since we want CLAY to constitute ALFRED, we should not have that ALFRED also constitutes CLAY. The next two statements of the definition endow CLAY with a property that ALFRED does not have. So that we can have CLAY constitutes ALFRED and ALFRED does not constitute CLAY. The second statement of the definition says that CLAY has a part that CLAY cannot loose but which ALFRED can loose. The third statement says that ALFRED does not have any such part which it cannot loose and which CLAY can loose.
So the second and third statements of the definition establish that CLAY is more tightly tied to its parts than ALFRED is. So this condition establishes an ontological difference between CLAY and ALFRED which makes us conclude that CLAY is not identical to ALFRED but merely constitutes ALFRED.


Things, stuffs and coincidence
Psarros approaches the problem from “language-analytical point of view”. He believes that the problem arises when a piece of bronze and a bronze statue are given same ontological status. According to him, “bronze is an abstract substance that does not refer to a thing, but merely to a specific way of talking about a common substantial aspect of things like a bronze statue and a bronze bar” (Psarros, 2001, pp. 27).

The following figure shows his approach:



According to him, the common aspect of bronze bar and bronze statue (the particulars) is called bronze which is abstract and thus a universal. We can proceed further by calling bronze and iron as particulars and the common aspect between them as substance which is a universal. In this way, he makes the relation between bronze and bronze statue clear.

Conclusion
In both the papers, the authors point that the problem of coinciding objects arises when we give same ontological status to CLAY and ALFRED or Bronze and Bronze bar. Further, both the authors give solutions which are quite similar. Thomson gives CLAY a status higher than ALFRED and shows that CLAY has a part that CLAY cannot loose but which ALFRED can loose, which is quite similar to the solution given by Psarros in which he gives bronze the status of genus or universal with respect to bronze statue or bronze bar.


References:

1. Thomson, J.J. (1998), “The statue and the clay”, NOUS, 32:2, (1998), pp. 149-157.
2. Psarros, N. (2001), “Things, stuffs and coincidence”, HYLE--International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, Vol. 7, No. 1 , pp. 23-29.
3. http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/temporal-parts/.