How Physicalism And ‘Common Sense’ Description Of The World Can Be Made Compatible?

1.0 Introduction

It is commonly known that physical theories conflict with our ordinary common sense views. For example, it is our ordinary experience that sun revolves around the earth; whereas, the scientific theory says that both sun and earth revolve about a point called center of mass (for the case of sun and earth, this approximately means that earth revolves around the sun, which is opposite to our ordinary experience). In the paper, the author is arguing for an interpretation of physicalism which is compatible with common sense.

The author argues that scientific discoveries cannot contradict in any fundamental way the tenets of common sense that are based on ordinary experience, if we believe that the scientific investigation involves a refinement of common sense. And, the scientific discoveries can only undermine those of our ordinary views about the world that are based on inadequate or distorted observation. I am unable to agree with this argument. It is our ordinary experience that we have free will (i.e. we have capability to make choices and decide among of them); I think this experience is neither inadequate nor distorted observation. But no physical theory can account for it; rather current physical theories reject it as entirely deceptive.

2.0 Tentative Realism

Physics is a precise discipline, that is, at any time most physicists agree as to which theories are acceptable. But there is no general agreement on the kind of interpretation to be given to the mathematical formalism of a physical theory.
















Now the question arises that does a successful mathematical formalism given a physicalist interpretation, constitute a possible theory of physics, as opposed perhaps to a theory of metaphysics. To this the author answers by presenting Popper’s solution of demarcation between physics and meta-physics on the basis of experimental falsifiability.

That is, the theory belongs to physics if it is experimentally falsifiable. From this requirement it become clear that the kind of interpretation required for the mathematical formalism demanded by physicalism is what is called ‘tentative realism’. It states that the fact that the theory must be open to experimental refutation ensures that it is meaningful to call a theory false, which in turn ensures that it must be meaningful to call the theory true.

3.0 An acceptable Physicalism

Author’s main aim in the paper is to present a kind of physicalism that is compatible with common sense. In order to do that, I think he is using the concept of drawing distinctions propounded by Spencer-Brown in his book ‘Laws of form’. Physical theory and common sense theory draw different kinds of distinctions in the world. Thus, they classify things in terms of different kinds of resemblances between things. Author suggests that the Physicalism that is needed in the present context should classify things in the following way:

1. The things are classified in the simplest possible way i.e. in terms of causal sequences.
2. The things are classified in terms of only those resemblances which any intelligent being, however its sensory equipment may be constructed can discern, discover, become aware of. That is, classification is sense-independent.

On the other hand, common sense theory classifies things in terms of resemblances which are discernible to human beings or are associated with their experiences.

Now, common sense theory has a property called ‘color’. This property is discernible to humans because of their sensory equipment. But it falls out of the periphery of physicalism if it satisfies the above two requirements. So in this way the common sense theory and physicalist theory is compatible.

References:

1. http://www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk/About%20Me.htm
2. Maxwell N. (1965: May – 1966: Feb), “PHYSICS AND COMMON SENSE”, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 16, pp. 295-311.